# PRIMITIVE MAN

CONTENTS

THE COMMUNITY CONCEPT IN THE STUDY AND GOVERNMENT OF AFRICAN AND AFRO-AMERICAN SOCIETIES [1]

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The field of political organization seems to be one of those where New World and Old World anthropologists can most fruitfully exchange their ideas. Africa, in particular, offers an extraordinarily wide range of political variation [2] and, in spite of a few authoritative monographs [3] and of one excellent collective

[1] Revision of a paper delivered at the 50th annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Chicago, 1951. It is based on field work by the author in the Belgian Congo, 1943–45; in Nigeria, 1948; in Haiti, 1937–41, 1949, and 1951.

[2] Much more so than America: Lowie, R. H., "Some Aspects of Political Organization among the American Aborigines," in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 78:11-24, 1948, published 1951.

[3] Such as, Herskovits, M. J., *Dahomey*, 2 vols., New York, 1938; Le Herisse, A., *L'ancien royaume du Dahomey*, Paris, 1911; Labouret, H., *Les tribus du Rameau Lobi*, Trav. Mém. Inst. Ethno. No. 15, Paris, 1931; Pages, R. P., *Au Ruanda, sur les bords du lac Kivu (Congo Belge)*, Brussels, 1933; Rattray, R. S., *Ashanti Law and Constitution*, London, 1929; Roscoe, J., *The Baganda*, London, 1911; Schapera, I., *The Political Annals*

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publication,[4] little systematic effort has been displayed toward drawing from isolated studies conclusions of general value, beyond the point that the traditional picture of African government is over-simplified. European anthropologists have been left almost alone to work in the African field, till only a few years ago, and their cautious attitude appears at first glance to be justified by the necessity of collecting more information. Work in other fields, such as kinship, which is the present fad of British anthropologists, however, must inevitably be done in accordance with some assumptions regarding the political institutions with which the others are interrelated. Thus, it became the accepted practice to divide all African political systems into two categories, according to the alleged presence or absence of an organized body of government, or state. It is only recently that an attempt was made at improving the traditional classification, and it is significant that this was done by an American-trained scholar, who distinguishes political systems according to the agencies and methods used for sanctioning their rules.[5] In such a classification, the Tallensi tribe of the Gold Coast stands at the bottom of the list, because not even associations are known to exist there and to be differentiated from the lineage groups.

One trouble with a classification of this kind is that it is based on the assumption that nothing escaped the attention of the worker in the field. To say that associations are unknown to the Tallensi, really amounts to saying that our only authority on this tribe has failed to mention them. On the other hand, we are also told about the Tallensi that two types of chiefs can be distinguished among them, the junior one being known locally as " custodian of the earth," and that " both rule communities." [6] This sounds like a safer starting point than the absence of men-

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of a Tswana Tribe, Cape Town, 1947; Talbot, P. A., *The Peoples of Southern Nigeria,* 4 vols., London, 1926.

[4] Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E. E. *African Political Systems,* London, 1940.

[5] Brown, P., "Patterns of Authority in West Africa," in *Africa,* 21:261–78, 1951.

[6] Fortes, M., *The Dynamics of Clanship among the Tallensi,* London, 1945, p. 182.

tion of associations, though we would still want to know more about these chiefs than being told that " no political power as we understand it " exists among the Tallensi.

The division of power between two types of chiefs, extended to the lowest possible level, exists outside the Gold Coast. Among the Kundu, or Mongo tribe of the Central Congo, such division is general. In the particular case of the Bankutshu sub-tribe of the Oshwe region, it exists in each one of nine independent political systems which are distributed over an area of 10,000 square miles, with a population of only 35,000 inhabitants in all (average per unit, less than 4,000). Each unit has a central and rather inefficient authority consisting of a senior chief, and each village has a highly respected local authority, that of the " master of the earth," around whom all life in the community centers.[7] There are, moreover, inter-tribal relationships which extend to the villages of Batwa pygmies on one hand, every pygmy village being the collective slave of a Kundu village,[8] while most units, on the other hand, claim that the neighboring unit located south of them also is a collective slave. Significant remarks have been made by a British colonial officer working in a third African area, the Tanganyika Territory, where the native political structure has been inquired into recently, in view of the failure of the celebrated " indirect rule " policy. It was found, for example, that in the tribal unit of the Wanyakyusa, twelve independent chiefs had been recognized for a total population of a quarter of a million (average, 20,000). These chiefs, once granted the full support of the colonial authorities, had made themselves unpopular for many reasons, one of them being hasty codification of customs and issuance of written laws. The British are now administering the country with the help of European-made councils, a system which gives more prominence than before to the village chiefs.[9]

[7] First observed by Maes, J., *Notes sur les populations des bassins du Kasai, de la Lukenie et du Lac Léopold II,* Brussels, 1924.

[8] De Langhe, A., and Comhaire, J., "De Batwa van het Gewest Oshwe," in *Zaïre,* 1:1145–47, 1947.

[9] Kingdon, Z. E., "The Initiation of a System of Local Government by

The fact that such observations were made by a colonial officer leads us to the general remark that, in addition to field work, there is a need for making use of the largely untapped source of anthropological material that consists of colonial government reports. These reports often include considerations on the native authorities of high value to anthropologists. A comparison of results obtained among similar societies, by government pursuing different policies, might be as fruitful a study as the observation of isolated native political units. By way of example, let us mention that the British who, in the early twenties, claimed to have found in "indirect rule" a truly scientific method of government, recognized in Nigeria 640 so-called "native authorities," in a population of 22 million (average, 34,000),[10] while the colonial organization in French West Africa gave prominence to 48,000 village chiefs (average, 320), rather than to 2,200 senior chiefs (average, 7,250).[11] As there has been, for the last thirty years, much greater peace and satisfaction among the rural population administered by the French than there has been in British territories, there is at least a chance that the French were right in their selection of the type of chief that should serve as the corner stone of their system of native administration. A French colonial governor once stated that the authority of the village chief has a sacred character, derived from the custody of the village grounds, and that this character is lacking in the senior chief, whose authority is a matter of conquest and of force as alien as that of the colonial power itself.[12] The new British policy, styled "local government," tends to put the village chief in a similar situation to that which he holds in French territories. Going back to the Tanganyika example, this is justified in a practical way by stating that "the basis of local authority in a Bantu community is not the power to dispense justice and mete out punishment, but

African Rural Councils in the Rungwe District of Tanganyika," in *Journal of African Administration*, 3:186–91, 1951.

[10] Perham, M., *Native Administration in Nigeria*, London, 1937.

[11] Delavignette, R., *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*, London, 1950.

[12] Delavignette, R., *op. cit.*, p. 75.

lies in a traditional heritage and in the power to allocate land." [13]

What remains to be seen is how such power of allocating land comes to the village chief. No one who knows African circumstances would say that this is a merely political problem. The belief that power is not just a matter of politics or economics but rather a social phenomenon may need demonstration in our sophisticated western world,[14] but it can be taken for granted in African societies. The village chief cannot possibly be distinguished from the tribal chief on the ground that he received his power from the latter one. The American concept of community may provide the answer. Its most common acceptance today is that of "the maximal group of persons who normally reside together in face-to-face association" and such a group, in contemporary America, is rarely found to exceed 1,000 to 1,200 people, even in individual instances.[15] There is no doubt that community feelings are strong in Africa. Though the word is seldom used by British anthropologists, and never in its American scholarly sense, what it means lies behind such remarks as the following, namely, that indirect rule actually narrowed the circle of activities of the Kede chiefs of Central Nigeria, by substituting a definite constitution imposed by the British—who, incidentally, themselves never accepted a constitution—to provide the all-round guidance and protection that the people previously expected from their chiefs in true community fashion.[16] The African village is a community *Americano sensu*, and the superiority of the "master of the earth" over the senior chiefs can apparently be explained by the fact that he benefits from the intensity of community spirit that prevails around him.

This capacity of the village community to produce its leader may be linked to the amazing capacity to produce chiefs that has been ascribed to Africa as a whole. Leaders come to the fore by

[13] Kingdon, Z. E., *op. cit.*

[14] Bierstedt, R., "An Analysis of Social Power," in *American Sociological Review*, 15: 720–38, 1950.

[15] Murdock, G. P., "Feasibility and Implementation of Comparative Community Research, with Special Reference to the Human Relations Area Files, in *American Sociological Review*, 15: 713–20, 1950.

[16] Nadel, F., in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *op. cit.*

informal ways that Europeans are unable to understand even among groups of migrant laborers going on the move all over the continent before harvest time.   The capacity of solving its problem of leadership spontaneously seems to be the outstanding characteristic of the African illiterate community.   Its reaction to written laws made by senior chiefs or by colonial authorities may well stem out of an unconscious feeling that a basic factor of their ancestral life is threatened by the advent of a technique making effective control through secondary contacts easier than under original native circumstances.   In European-made urban centers, on the other hand, the breakdown of community life may go far to explain the difficulties observed in developing native leadership.

As to rural areas, an Afro-American example of this cultural trait may be found in Haiti.   To speak of the national government of Haiti would be a task beyond the scope of this study, and I do not intend to show here how the subject has been mishandled by observers of doubtful anthropological authority.   I am referring to the Haitian system of local government, which is remarkable for its stability and smooth functioning, and which has never been subject to a systematic inquiry.   Government-appointed *commandants* all over the Republic are in charge of 551 "sections," with an average population of 5,800 souls each.[17] This, according to the written law, is as small a unit as is recognized by the national government, and it is worth mentioning that the Belgians, in the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, which is twice the size of Haiti, have recognized twice that number (exactly, 1,118) of "hill chiefs," with an average population of 3,500 for each hill.[18]

But how does a Haitian section work?   It is the law of Haiti that the *commandant* exercises only strictly defined powers of police, and that he may request the help of not more than two assistants, with no particular territorial jurisdiction.   A different

[17] République d'Haiti, *Recensement de la République d'Haiti, Premier dénombrement de la population,* Port au Prince, 1951.

[18] Comhaire, J., "Situation générale du Ruanda-Urundi," in *Zaïre* 5:1047–54, 1951.

picture is obtained when travelling across the country and ob-
serving the *commandants* at work in such places as the Marbial
valley, where four of them are in charge of a population of 30,000
(average, 7,500). The *commandant,* though a peasant himself, is
conscious that his appointment was made by some remote
authority foreign to the local population. So when, on every
Friday morning, he starts preparing his report for the police
officer in town, all necessary precautions are taken to secure the
approval of the communities all around. Their representatives
are there, usually two dozen of them (average, circa 310), sit-
ting beside him under the thatched roof that constitutes his office.
They tell him about all events, and more than one judicial case
is settled between them, informally, in a pleasant manner that
the Haitian law ignores but which has been recognized as legal
in French African territories. The main source of trouble, under
such happy circumstances, is the existence of written papers
which persons of bad faith sometimes use against the illiterate
and community-minded peasants, especially in the matter of
land tenure.[19]

This subject, as all anthropological subjects, certainly requires
more research than has gone into this study. Nevertheless there
seem to be valid reasons for taking the community concept into
account, when trying to analyze the structure of power in Africa
and in Afro-American societies. Let us, however, beware of the
exaggeration that African political units might be nothing more
than communities, and that they could, as such, be contrasted
with the "government-run" societies of the so-called civilized
peoples. The senior chiefs, so far as I can see, are regular heads
of government. Their authority exists, though it is weaker and
more remote so long as the intense community spirit, which is the
soul of village life and the strength of the "master of the earth,"
is not interfered with by the technological capacity of maintain-
ing adverse secondary contacts through the medium of the
written word.

[19] Comhaire-Sylvain, S., *Land Tenure in the Marbial Region of Haiti,*
in Acculturation in the Americas, Selected Papers of the XXIXth Inter-
national Congress of Americanists, Chicago, 1952, pp. 180–84.

I have limited my hypothesis to fields which I know from first-hand observation. Certain remarks which others have made about American Indians lead me to suspect that this may be a more widespread phenomenon. It is said, for instance, regarding Northwest Coast society that "the strictly political powers of a chief were disproportionately small when compared with his social eminence." [20] Even in contemporary American society, community influence has been found to be related to the extent of control of local activities by higher authorities.[21]

[20] Lowie, R. H., *Primitive Society*, New York, 1920, p. 383.
[21] White, J. E., "Theory and Method for Research in Community Leadership," in *American Sociological Review*, 15:50–60, 1950.

RESEARCH, APPLICATION, AND THE INTERMEDIATE PROCESS

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A recent article by John Gillin[1] stresses the need for "scientific understanding of the behavior and attitudes of the world's peoples." Such understanding "should go far toward avoiding and eliminating intergroup conflicts."

Implicit in these two statements of Gillin's are at least two kinds of thought processes for anthropologists. On the one hand, scientific understanding can be reached only through the scientific study of behavior and attitudes. On the other hand, group conflicts can be avoided only through application, i.e., through an emphasis upon action rather than study.

The immediate aims of the person engaged in pure scientific study are often different from those of the person engaged in application. Furthermore, while engaged in their special interests, the two have different psychological orientations.

So great is the seeming hiatus between the two kinds of thought processes related to the two interests that some have questioned that they can be included in one discipline. And, truly, when an anthropologist's thought processes are concerned with observing and studying according to certain specific procedures, i.e., when he is doing pure science, he is doing a different kind of thinking from when he is concerned with applying.

Although recognizing the etymological inconsistency involved in attaching one name (anthropology) to two distinct processes, we may here consider them as functions of people adhering to one discipline. Usage has tended to present both processes as legitimate functions of anthropologists doing anthropology. We

[1] Gillin, John, "Methodological Problems in Anthropological Study of Modern Cultures," *American Anthropologist*, n.s. 51:392–99, 1949.

find in much of the literature a discussion of both scientific anthropology and applied anthropology. For instance, in three recent and excellent comprehensive texts on the discipline, we find anthropology defined as science [2] and discussed as such; but we also find numerous discussions of applied anthropology. Each is given a formal entity for purposes of presentation.

However, the hiatus between the two is not always clearly bridged in some anthropological literature. The purpose of this article is to comment upon a third and connecting process, implicit in the other two but seldom abstracted from them.

Perhaps the intent of the article will be more clear if the matter is first presented in general terminology, avoiding a specialized vocabulary of any one discipline. Let us, for purposes of identification, label these three processes as "research," "application," and "engineering."

What is called a science is usually so termed in recognition of the empirical research activities of the people involved. What is called application is usually so termed in recognition of the applicatory activities of the people involved. In one the people inquire about the unknown; in the other they systematically and skillfully apply existing knowledge.

In anthropological circumstances a person engaged in pure science seeks by observation and investigation to discover, for instance, the life-ways of a society and the generalizations to be derived therefrom. A person doing applied work seeks by application of anthropological knowledge to change certain life-ways or aspects of life-ways.

The expressed goals of the Society for Applied Anthropology, as found in the statement of purpose in Applied Anthropology and Human Organization, are "scientific investigation" and "application of . . . principles." But applications must be immediately directed toward specific problems even though the solutions of these problems may have broader significance. The

[2] Gillin, John, *The Ways of Men: An Introduction to Anthropology*, New York, 1948, mentions on p. 14, theoretical, methodological, and applied aspects. See also, Herskovits, Melville J., *Man and His Works: The Science of Cultural Anthropology*, New York, 1948, p. 3; and Kroeber, *Anthropology*, New York, 1948, p. 1.

ultimate, if not the immediate, goal of scientific investigation is often held to be the determining of generalities, or even laws, and the immediate goal is that of contributing to knowledge. The immediate interests of the two are different. It might seem that the common eventual goal of furthering science would no more justify considering "anthropological" pure research and application as belonging to one discipline than it would justify considering anthropology and sociology as belonging to one discipline. To consider them as parts of unified discipline, we would like to bridge more fully the gap between them.

To this author, the process of "engineering," as he defines it, helps fill the hiatus between research and technology. Engineering sometimes connotes plotting or scheming, but such connotation is in no sense intended here. Engineering, as used here, involves the art of taking materials from a source (pure science) and the making of them into a useful structure (i.e., making them available for application). Or, to word the idea differently, engineering involves directing sources of power for the use of men, or creating means of utilizing resources in the most effective manner. Engineering is an abstract related to both searching for and applying, but it also possesses its own characteristic, that of providing a means for accomplishing a purpose or similar kinds of purposes.

So conceived, engineering[3] offers one method of bringing the processes involved in pure research ("scientific understanding") closer to the processes involved in application ("avoiding and eliminating . . . conflicts"). The present article will illustrate its intent by using the data of one cultural situation. Using that situation, the author will attempt to show the thought processes which pertain to pure science, those which pertain to engineering, and those classifiable as application. For purposes of simplification, the conflicts considered here will be intragroup.

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[3] The choice of the term "engineering" for the intermediate process does not completely satisfy the author. Other terms have been considered such as "systematization," "operationalism," and "structuralization." The main purpose of this paper is to describe the intermediate process; a better term for it may be developed later.

The illustrative material is drawn from the writer's field study at Isleta Pueblo, New Mexico.[4] The immediate subject for field study was a disturbed political situation at Isleta, one that expressed itself in factionalism and strife, both on the personal and sub-group levels.

Much of this strife had its roots in the Pueblo's historic past—in such things as: (1) a Pueblo tendency to political fragmentation, (2) Laguna colonists who had lived at Isleta for almost seventy years and had provided reasons for discord, (3) the railroad which runs by the Pueblo and which had injected disturbing elements into Isleta life, (4) the size of the Pueblo and its compactness, factors often conducive to intragroup disharmony.

More recent factors contributing to strife at Isleta included: (1) the death of Pablo Abeita and the failure to develop a new, strong, secular leader, (2) the lack of even a pretender-Cacique, (3) acculturating influences stemming from increased employment in nearby Albuquerque, (4) recent political schisms and the lack of a universally recognized secular government, (5) the Constitution adopted in March 1947.

In March 1947 the people of Isleta, in cooperation with the Indian Service, adopted a political Constitution which set up an executive branch (Governor), a legislative branch (Council), and a judicial branch (Judiciary). For an extended previous period the Pueblo had been undergoing political (and religious) disorganization and disharmony. The new secular government represented an attempt to recreate a community of secular beliefs and activities.

Experience soon demonstrated that opposition to the newly instituted Judiciary became the rallying point for opponents of the Constitution and for the expression of factional disputes rooted in other matters.

The Judiciary, composed of a President and two members, was selected by the Governor with the approval of the Council; but it

formed an independent branch of the government. Previously, secular judicial activity in the Pueblo had been performed by the Governor.

The establishment of a new and independent Judiciary, separated from previous religious and secular officials who had had judicial functions, was largely the result of an intellectual decision that did not appreciate fully the emotional significance of the act. No adequate historical precedent existed for a Judiciary whose sole function was judging. Precedent indicated both religious leaders and the Governor were regarded as judges in their own fields. As a result of radical innovation, strong, and sometimes violent, opposition developed toward the government of the new Constitution; and, by thought transference, the Judiciary became the symbol of what was wrong with the new government, although actually other things were also considered objectionable. The controversy still continues.

So the situation, in brief, had been one of social disharmony and an overt attempt to remedy the disharmony by largely political means. Our problem is to see how the Isletan experiment illustrates the need for supplementing the results of research with certain engineering principles and techniques.

The applicatory construct used in the attempted solution was the political Constitution, framed by co-operative activity of people from Isleta and the United Pueblos Agency in Albuquerque. The Pueblo is fortunate in having among its members several people of good ability, and some of these helped draft the Constitution. The Indian Service officials involved were conscientious and intelligent. The Isletans and government officials knew much about the Isletan way of life and Pueblo life in general. Furthermore, they had some acquaintance with the viewpoints and conclusions of anthropologists; for some in both groups had read anthropological literature or had consulted with anthropologists. Perhaps the Isletans were too close to the scene to take a sufficiently detached view; but the point remains that the people involved knew much of the enthnographical and ethnological data, present and historic, which pertained to their problem. Although the ethnographical data about Isleta leaves

much to be desired, it would seem that the persons involved in
drawing up the Constitution had sufficient knowledge of Isletan
life in particular and Pueblo life in general to have an abundance
of source material for use in building a political construct.

It is conceivable that much of the antagonism toward the new
Constitution might have been avoided had the known data been
consciously formulated into engineering principles and only then
applied to the situation at hand. The illustration offered by the
Isletan situation gives evidence of the widespread lack of con-
scious awareness of a need for engineering.

Let us see, with the benefit of hindsight, how the pre-Constitu-
tion Isletan situation might have been studied. We shall use the
points of view of research scientists, applied scientists, and
engineers.

If the political situation at Isleta prior to the adoption of the
Constitution had been studied by a research scientist, he could
have justifiably reached certain conclusions of a generalized
nature. One conclusion would have been a substantiation of
what he probably already knew, namely, that when independent
groups change culturally and socially, they usually make modifi-
cations in the known and proceed in a gradual fashion toward
the as yet unknown and the different.

Or, more narrowly, the research scientist might have noted,
among other things, that characteristics of Isleta and Pueblo life
include an intermingling of the religious and the secular, a tend-
ency toward perpetuative nativism, and a practice of usually
accepting only those new religious and secular practices which
may be compared with the old practices.

If the political situation at Isleta had been studied by an ap-
plied scientist, he might have emphasized particular charac-
teristics of the specific situation. Among things forcibly brought
to his attention would have been who composed what faction,
what ideas each faction held, who were influential in the factions,
how effectively a proposed Judiciary might perform (judged in
the light of historic knowledge), and what actions might be
taken by those favorable to and opposed to the new Constitution
in general and each branch of it in particular.

It is helpful to separate research and application in one's thought processes, even though one keeps in mind the data of both. An anthropologist can more successfully utilize the two processes if he recognizes a rationally distinctive thought process called engineering.

If the political situation at Isleta had been studied by an anthropologist using the thought processes of a cultural engineer, he might have noted that the office of Governor under the contemplated Constitution could be compared by Isletans to the office of Governor with which they previously were familiar. He could have noted that the Constitutional Council (of twelve) could be compared with the previous Council (of twelve). He also could have noted the lack of adequate precedent for a purely secular Judiciary formed as a third branch of the government.

The anthropologist, functioning as an engineer and constructing a means of utilizing anthropological knowledge for application to particular kinds of situations [5] by the anthropologist functioning as an applied anthropologist, might have constructed a principle that historical tradition would indicate the need for a more functional link between the Judiciary and the Governor. He might have suggested that a Judiciary of three could be set up as a theoretically separate branch of the government but that, in practice, it might be better to let the Governor and a religious leader serve as two of the three members. Thus he could have attempted to establish both a link with the past through letting these people exercise, in another capacity, some of their former judicial functions; and he could have attempted to anticipate the future through approving the positions of one new and unaffiliated member. Then the applied anthropologist, using the engineer's concepts, could get down to particularities of persons, ideas, and situations.

The foregoing example has attempted to illustrate not only the aspects of each of the three processes of research, engineering,

[5] For example, the anthropological engineer, after surveying the literature about the Pueblos, would develop sets of differentiated structural concepts which evolved from the data about Eastern and Western Pueblos and which could be used in solving practical problems in either or both areas.

and application but also the overlapping of the three. It has attempted to present nothing wholly new to anthropology.

The existence of these processes has been previously recognized in various ways in anthropological literature. For instance, Kluckhohn and Leighton [6] say they seek answers to questions dealing not only with the Navaho but with any minority group (i.e., answers of an engineering nature). They seek generalized concepts of the human results of any specific example of application. Kroeber [7] touches upon the need for engineering, although he seems to be considering mainly two processes—which in this article have been called research and application. Leighton [8] speaks of "discovery" and "application," but is aware of the great gap between the two. Gillin [9] speaks of planning and engineering, but seems to consider them a part of the process of applying. Herskovits [10] speaks of basic research and the "second story" of application. He uses application in what he calls an engineering sense. His "third story" is the scientists' seeing to it that application does not misuse the results of research.

However, a conscious awareness does not seem to prevail among anthropologists that ameliorative applied anthropology cannot be thoroughly developed until adequate thought has first been given to the generalizations of research plus the structural principles of engineering.

In summary, it is maintained in this article that the anthropologist, if he is to be conceived of as one who not only studies but also applies, must be conscious of three kinds of thought processes. Any one person may engage in all three in one project, although it is easier to confine each project to one process at a time. In any case, he must approach each process with the appropriate mental orientation for that kind of thought.

As a pure scientist, the anthropologist collects data and inter-

[6] Kluckhohn. Clyde. and Leighton. Dorothea. *The Navaho*, Cambridge. 1946, p. XX.

[7] Kroeber. *op. cit.*, p. 845.

[8] Leighton. Alexander H., *Human Relations in a Changing World*, New York. 1949. p. 100.

[9] Gillin. John, *The Ways of Men*, New York, 1948, p. 613.

[10] Herskovits. *op. cit.*, p. 649.

prets them in the form of generalized concepts. As an engineer, he arranges source material with certain broad structural goals in mind. As an applied anthropologist, he approaches the problems of particular kinds of people and kinds of situations only after having given thought to the general conclusions and the specifically structural concepts which can guide him.

The first kind of thought process has a goal of unravelling cultural process. The second has a goal of creating structural principles. The third has a goal of ameliorating particular sociocultural situations.

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